Executive summary
Chapter 1
Global competition for critical materials intensified further in 2025 and 2026. The EU has set ambitious targets to reduce its dependence on non-EU countries, but is facing challenges when it comes to achieving these. China has further tightened its export controls on various critical materials, while the United States is actively seeking to secure its access to critical materials through investments and international partnerships. Increasingly, the availability of these materials is a vital issue for both defence and the energy transition.
In the longer term, technological dependence is playing an ever-greater role. China is leading the way in high-quality scientific research in critical technology and also investing heavily in technologies that are expected to grow in importance, including advanced AI. In addition to critical materials, it is therefore also useful to look at other, non-critical materials that are periodically included in the broader European raw materials assessment; in this publication, these are referred to as monitored materials. Furthermore, the Netherlands’ dependence on critical materials is, to a significant extent, due to imported products that contain critical materials, such as computers from China. For this reason, this publication looks at both the materials themselves and at products that contain critical or monitored materials.
Chapter 2
After Germany, the Netherlands is the EU’s largest importer of critical and monitored materials, as well as products containing critical and monitored materials. When intra-EU trade is excluded, however, the difference between the two countries is considerably smaller than when it is included. This is because many goods enter the Netherlands from non-EU countries before being transported to Germany (which Germany then counts as its own imports). When intra-EU trade is excluded, the Netherlands is actually the EU’s largest importer of critical materials from non-EU countries.
Aluminium makes up the largest share of imports of critical materials, by value. For monitored materials and products containing monitored materials, iron is the most significant. With respect to products that contain critical materials, rare earth elements and platinum group metals are leading. In terms of imports by weight, coking coal is the most important critical material, while iron is the most important for monitored materials and products containing them. For products containing critical materials, aluminium accounts for the largest share of imports, by weight.
Norway is the Netherlands’ leading supplier of critical materials by import value, driven primarily by aluminium. China is the leading supplier of products containing critical materials, with products containing rare earth elements playing a major role. Germany is the Netherlands’ leading supplier of monitored materials and products containing them, with iron being particularly important. When all four import groups are combined, China is the Netherlands’ leading supplier.
Chapter 3
In this chapter, we consider import figures from the perspective of the transfer of economic ownership rather than physical border crossings. Quasi-transit is excluded under this approach, resulting in a lower import value than in Chapter 2
When defined in this manner, imports of critical materials amounted to 12.4 billion euros in 2024, accounting for 2.4 percent of total goods imports. Of the 12.4 billion euros of critical materials imported in 2024, over 7.0 billion euros, or 56.7 percent, consisted of imports for re-export. Two-thirds of these re-exports went to just four countries: Germany, Belgium, France, and Italy. Imports of critical materials for processing by companies in the Netherlands amounted to 5.4 billion euros. Of this total, 2.3 billion euros was used for the domestic market and 3.1 billion euros for exports.
In 2024, 6,810 companies imported one or more critical materials; that is 7.9 percent of all goods-importing companies in the Netherlands. Consequently, a relatively large number of companies were involved in importing critical materials, even though these materials accounted for only 2.4 percent of the Netherlands’ total import value. As a result, the average import value per company involved was relatively low. However, this does not mean that imports were evenly distributed among those companies. On the contrary, import value within this group was highly concentrated among a small number of large importers. For thirteen materials, this share exceeded 70 percent, including feldspar, helium, and graphite.
Chapter 4
Chapter 4 assesses the criticality of critical materials for the Dutch economy across three dimensions: supply risk, economic impact, and expected growth in utilisation. This analysis covers both the materials themselves and the products that they are used to make.
Six materials stand out in the overall analysis due to their combination of a high supply risk, economic significance, and relatively strong expected growth in utilisation: gallium, germanium, graphite, cobalt, niobium, and silicon metal. Gallium has the highest overall criticality. Its supply risk is high due to the heavy concentration of global production and processing in China, while gallium is important to the Dutch economy because of its applications in semiconductors and other electronic products, among others. The economic importance of germanium, graphite, and silicon metal increases primarily when products containing these materials are included. Cobalt and niobium are among the materials with high criticality, both as raw materials and semi-finished products, as well as in finished products.